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SITUATION "VIII. 
During the \Yar bet\Yeen the United States and State 
X, t\Y·o \Var vessels of State X are lying in the harbor 
of neutral State Y. These vessels go out of the harbor, 
beyond the jurisdiction of State Y, are damaged 
severely by \var Yessels of the United States, and return 
to the harbor of State Y, \Yhere they are abandoned and 
sink. The cre\Ys of these vessels are succored and re-
ceived on board of neutral \Yar vessels belonging to 
States A, B, and C, \Yhich are \Yithin the port. The 
United States co1nmander claims these cre\Ys as prisoners 
of \Yar. 
(a) Is the clai1n justifiable? 
(b) ''That disposition should be made of the cre\Ys if 
the commanders claim is not allo,,-ed? 
SOLUTION". 
(a) The claim of the United States commander that 
the cre\YS are prisoners of \Yar is not justifiable. The 
crew·s had at no time been \Vithin the po\ver of the United 
States commander. 
(b) The crew·s should be interned or other\vise disposed 
so that they n1ay not again take part in the \Yar. 
XOTES OX SITUATIOX VIII. 
(a) The United States \Yar vessels damage t\YO ves-
sels of State X in battle on the high seas. These vessels 
seek refuge in the neutral port of State Y. There the 
vessels are abandoned and sink. The cre,,-s of the aban-
doned vessels are received upon neutral \Yar vessels of 
other States than Y, \Yhich vessels chance to be in the 
port. The United States commander then claims the 
cre\vs of the vessels as prisoners of \Yar. 
The first question \Vhich naturally arises is as to the 
status of the cre\vs of the abandoned vessels of State X. 
Prisoners of war .-Are they prisoners of \Var? The 
definition of the term prisoner of \Var is fairly uniform. 
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.. A .. ccording to the Instructions for the Govern1nent of 
Armies of the United States in the Field (General Orders, 
No. 100), article 49-
_-\. prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to the hostile 
army for acti,·e aid, who has fallen into the hands of the captor, either fight-
ing or wounded, on the field, or in the hospital, by individual surrender, or 
by capitulation. 
All soldiers of '"hatever species of arms; all men who belong to the rising 
en masse of the hostile country; all those who are attached to the army for 
its efficiency and promote directly the object of war, except such as are 
hereinafter provided for; all disabled men or officers on the field or else-
where, if captured; all enemies who have thrown away their arms and ask 
for quarter, are prisoners of war, and as such exposed to the inconYeniences 
as well as entitled to the privileges of a prisoner of war. 
The Brussels Convention of 187 4, article 23, says: 
Prisoners of war are lawful and disarmed enemies. They are in the 
power of the enemy's Government, but not of the individuals or of the corps 
who made them prisoners. 
They should be treated with humanity. 
E\ery act of insubordination authorizes the necessary measures of 
severity to be taken with regard to them. 
All their personal effects, except their arms, are considered to be their own 
property . 
. A.ccording to the Oxford l\Ianual of the La\vs of \Var 
on Land, 1880: 
ART. 21. Persons forming part of the armed forces of belligerents, on fall-
ing into the power of the enemy, must be treated as prisoners of war, con-
formably to article 61, and those following it. 
This rule applies to messengers openly carrying official dispatches, and to 
ci\il aeronauts employed to obserTe the enemy or to keep up communication 
between different parts of the army or territory. 
The Hague Convention, 1899, provides that-
ART. 3. The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of com-
batants and noncombatants. In case of capture by the enemy both have 
a right to be treated as prisoners of war. 
Reasons why crews are not prisoners of war.-It "-ill be 
seen from the Situation under discussion that the provi-
sions requisite for the 1naking of the cre\YS prisoners of 
" ... ar had not been n1et in the case of the cre\vs of the 
vessels of State X. 
The single ground of failure to capture therefore 
" ... ould be sufficient to vitiate the claim of the co1nmander. 
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rrhere are various other reasons ,,-hy the claim of the 
co1nn1ander is not correct. (1) The enemy's ships must 
con1e "-ithin the po"·er of the 1Inited States commander 
before they can be 1na.de prisoners of \Yar. In this Situ-
ation "-bile the enen1y's ships are clan1aged they had not 
co1ne under the po\\·er of the 1Jnited States co1nmander_, 
and the cre\\-s had not, therefore, been 1nade prisoners 
of \Va.r. At no ti1ne had the con1n1ander had the power 
to say "-hat should be the disposition of the cre\vs. 
Before the cre\\-s had deserted the yessels they had been 
under their o\\-n flag, and this "-as still the case after 
they had left the vessel, provided they had left in their 
O\Vn boats. 
(2) On passing "-ithin the lin1its of neutral State Y, 
the field of belligerent action "-as passed. The only 
relations 'vhich the Yessels of State :X could maintain in 
the port \\-ould be peaceful relations. Hence the com-
mander could not in port take prisoners of \Yar \vithout 
violating the neutrality of State· Y. 
(3) On going on board the "-a.r vessels of States A, B, 
and C, the cre"·s of the vessels of State X passed \vithin 
the jurisdiction of those States. and neither neutral State 
Y nor the United States could prestnne to exercise juris-
diction over those Yessels because o·f their reception. 
X eutral State Y \Yould not interfere, because the crews 
of the vessels of State X "-ere apparently under their 
0\\-n flag until they had passed under the flags of A, B, 
and C. Even if the crew"S had been con1pelled to enter 
the "-ater "-ithout boats, and had been obliged to s\vim 
to the vessels of A, B, and C, though it might be held 
technically that w·hile in the \Yater and not under the 
organized control of their o\\·n officers the cre\vs \vere 
under the jurisdiction of State Y because State Y \vas 
sovereign over the harbor \Vaters, yet \vhen they passed 
on board the \var vessels of States~.\., B, and C, the cre\vs 
passed out of the jurisdiction of State Y. 
P·ublic vessels in foreign ports .-Halleck, speaking of 
the general privileges of public Yessels in foreign ports, 
says: 
Where there are no express prohibitions, the .ports of one state are con-
sidered as open to the public armed and commissioned vessels of every other 
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nation with whom it is at peace. Such ships are exempt from the jurisdic-
tion of the local tribunals and authorities, ·whether they enter the ports 
under express pennission, stipulated by treaty, or a permission implied from 
the absence of prohibition. This exemption, which is termed ''extra-
territoriality, ' ' extends not only to the belligerent ships of war, priYateers, 
and the prizes of either, who seck a temporary refuge in neutral \Vaters from 
the casualties of the sea and war, but also to prisoners of war on board any 
prize or public yessel of her captor. Such vessels, in the command of a 
public officer, possess in the ports of a neutral the rights of extra-territorial-
ity, and are not subject to the local jurisdiction. But whateYer may be the 
nature and extent of the exemption of the public or private Ycssels of one 
state., from the local jurisdiction in the ports of another, it is evident that 
this exemption, whether express or implied, can ne\·er be construed to 
justify acts of hostility committed by such Yessel, her officers and crew, in 
violation of the law of nations against the security of the state in whose ports 
she is received, or to exclude the local tribunals and authorities from resort-
ing to such measures of self-defense as the security of the state may require. 
Therefore a public vessel would not hesitate to give up to the local authori-
ties a person accused of a serious crime who might come aboard her, and it is 
probable that she might even do so in the case of a person evading con-
scription. (Halleck's !nternat. Law, vol. 1, p. 215.) 
As neutral State Y "·ould not presurne to exercise 
jurisdiction over the "·ar vessels. of States A, B, and C, 
under the circurnstances, n1uch less could the commander 
of a United States "·ar vessel in a neutral port exercise 
any authority or even clairn as prisoners the cre\\·s of the 
vessels of State X, \vhich had never been in his po"·er. 
This case also differs from a case in ""hich the ship"·recked 
or "rounded are picked up upon the scene of a naval 
engagernent. These cre\vs in the harbor of State Y are 
removed from the exercise of authority on the part of the 
United States conunander: (1) by the fact that the succor 
"\Vas afforded in a neutral port, and (2) by the fact that the 
succor \Vas afforded upon neutral yessels of other states 
temporarily " rithin the neutral port of Y. 
Oonclusion.-The claim of the United States corn-
mander that the rescued cre\\"S should be delivered to him 
as prisoners of "·ar could not be sustained. 
(b) There next arises the question of the disposition of 
these cre\vs \Vhich have gone on board the "·ar vessels of 
States A, B, and C. 
Captain J[ a han's position .-Captain ~Iahan, in a paper 
before the peace conference at 'l:'he Hague, on June 20, 
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1899, argued that son1e definite provisions should be 
ll1ade for cre\\-s shipl\Tecked in oattle. He said: 
* * * On a field of ntn-al battle the ships are constantly in movement; 
not merely the movement of a land battle, but a movement of progress, of 
translation from place to place more or less rapid. The scene is here one 
moment; a half hour later it may be five miles distant. In such a battle it 
happens that a ship sinks; her crew become naufragf>s; the place of action 
shifts; it is no longer where these men are struggling for life; the light 
cruisers of their own side come to help, but they are not enough; the hospital 
ships with the neutral flag come to help; neutral ships other than hospital 
also arrive; a certain number of combattants naujragf:s are saved on board 
neutral ships. To which belligerent do these men belong~ It n1ay happen 
that the neutral vessel, hospital or otherwise, has been with the fleet opposed 
to the sunken ship. After fulfilling her work of mercy she naturally 
returns to that fleet. The combattants naufragf>s fall into the power of the 
enemy, although it is quite probable that the fleet to which they belong 
may have had the advantage. 
I maintain that unless some provision is made to meet this difficulty 
much recrinlination will arise. A few private seamen, more or less, a few 
sub-officers, may not matter, but it is possible that a distinguished general 
officer, or valuable officers of the lower grade Inay be affected. This will 
tend to bring into discredit the whole system for hospital ships; but further, 
while hospital ships, being regularly commissioned by their own govern-
ment may be supposed to act with DPrfect impartiality, such presupposition 
is not permissible in the case of vessels named in Article 6. Vnless the 
status of calnbattants nauiragf>s saved by them is defined, the grossest 
irregularities may be expected-the notoriety of which will fully repay the 
class of men who would perpetrate them. 
As many cases may arise, all of which it is impossible to meet specifically, 
I propose the following additional articles, based upon the single general 
principle that combattants naufragf:s, being ipso facto combatants hors de 
combat, are incapable of seiTing again during the war, unless reraptured or 
until duly exchanged. 
Captain :\Iahan e1nbodied his ideas in the follo,Ying 
articles, 'Yhich, ho,,-eYer, 'vere not adopted: 
1. In the case of neutral vessel-; of any kino, hospital ships or others, 
being on the scene of a naval engagement., which Inay, as an act of humanity, 
save men in peril of drowning, from the results of the engagement, such 
neutral vessels shall not be considered as having violated their nPutrality 
by that fact alone. They will, hmvever, in so doing act at their own risk 
and peril. 
2. ~[en thus rescued shall not be r.onsidered under the cover of the neutral 
flag, in case a demand for their surrender is made by a ship of war of eitlu•r 
belligerent. They are open thus to capture or to recapture. If such 
demand is made, the men so rescued must be given up, and shall then 
have the same status as though they had not been under a neutral flag. 
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3. In case no such demand is made by a be1ligerent ship, the men so 
rescued, haYing been delh .. ered from the consequences of the fight by 
neutral interposition, are to be considered hors de combat, not to sen·e for 
the rest of the war unless duly exchanged. The Contracting GoYernments 
engage to preYent, as far as possible, such persons from sen-ing until dis-
charged. (Holls. Peace Conference at The Hague. p. 50-L) 
Captain :Jiahan's first article is Yery general. It coYers 
"neutral Yessels of any kind, hospital or others, being. 
on the scene of a naval engage1nent, " .. hich n1ay, as an 
act of humanity, save n1en in peril of dro" .. ning from 
the results of the engage1nen t.'' In the second article 
he n1aintains that "men thus rescued shall not be con-
sidered under the cover of the neutral flag, in case a 
demand for their surrender is n1ade by a ship of "-ar of 
either belligerent." 
These proYisions as he n1en tions "·ould particularly 
apply to cases in\olYing circun1stances si1nilar to those 
under "-hich the yacht Deerhound saYed 1nen of the 
Alaba1na, of " .. hich :Jir. Se"-ard said to :Jir .. A.da1ns in a 
letter of July 15> 1864: 
I freely admit. that it is no part of n neutral's duty to assist in making cap-
tures for a belligerent, but I maintain it to be equally clear that, so far 
from being neutrality, it is direct hostility for a stranger to intervene and 
rescue men who harl been cast into the ocean in battle, and then carry them 
a'Yay from under the conqueror's guns. 
The case under consideration in this situation, ho"--
ever, does not contemplate rescue by a private ship as 
in the case of the Deerhound: but by a ship of " .. ar not 
upon the scene of hostilities, but in a neutral port. The 
cre,, ... s are received on board a neutral "-ar vessel, and a 
'var vessel fro1n its ·very nature can not be subjected to 
the provisions of the above articles. 
Lawrence's opinion.-La"Tence, in his "War and Xeu-
trality in the Far East," page 71, " .. hich appears as this 
is 'vritten, says: 
\ 
The Chemulpo incident shows, among other things, that provision wi1l 
have to be made in future for assistance by neutral ships of war, as well 
as by neutral ho<spital ships and ordinary neutral Yessels. The nature of 
such proYision is still open to contro,ersy. \Ye may hope to see the rejec-
tion of Captain ~Iahan's idea that neutral rescuers should be bound to gi'e 
up their unhurt refugees to the first belliberent war ship which demands 
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them. Another project is that the neutral vessel which has gathered them 
up should report itself immediately to the belligerent commander controll-
ing the scene of operations and take its orders from him, which would 
mean in most cases the ~urrender of the refugees as prisoners of war. This 
latter plan might sometimes be found difficult in practice. There have 
been cases when neither party controlled the scene after the action was over .. 
The indecisive eonflict between Sir Robert Calder and Villeneuve on 
July 22, 180.5, is a case in point.. Another instancP mny be taken from the 
battle of the Yalu, fought on September 17, 1894, at the close of which 
both the Japanese and the Chinese fleets left the waters in which they had 
contended. But. quite apart from the fact that sometimes there may be 
no commander in control on the spot where the battle was fought, the 
principle underlying the proposals we haYe described seems inadmissible. 
It involves the deneutralization of humanity. If the rescued men are 
surrendered to their own side, they wm again become combatants; if they 
are surrendered to the other side, they will be made prisoners of war. To 
assist in bringing about either of these consummations is surely inconsistent 
with neutrality. There remain the alternatives of "internment"-that 
is to say, keeping them in honorable detention under neutral guardianship 
for the rest of the war-or handing them over to their own friends in 
exchange for a solemn promise that they shall not serve again while hos-
tilities continue. * * * 
We interpret the obligations of neutrality and humanity more str:ctly 
than our fathers, but we need an international agreement to give symmetry 
and stability to our views. 'Yhen it comes to be negotiated the precedent 
.of Chemulpo will undoubtedly make for a Yery wide right of rescue on the 
part of neutral vessels, both public and private. But vv·e may hope it will 
not be pressed in favor of anything approaching a right of interference in 
the struggle. It is one thing to save the life of a man struggling in the 
water, quite another to help him in keeping himself and his ship out of the 
hands of the victor. 
Hague Conference Provisions.-Article VI of the ''Con-
vention Bet,veen the United States of Ameriea and 
Certain Pov\Ters for the Adaptation to 1Iaritime vVarfare 
. of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 
1864" (Hague Convention), ratified by the United States 
in 1900, provides that-
"Neutral merchantmen, yachts, or vessels having or taking on board 
sick, wounded, or shipwrecked of the belligerents can not be captured for 
so doing, but they are liable to capture for any violation of neutrality they 
may have committed." 
Article LVII of the "Convention Bet,veen the United 
States of America and Certain Po,vers, 'Vith Respect to 
the La,vs and Customs of War on Land" (Hague Conven-
12J RESCUE OF SHIP\\"RECKED BELLIGERENTS. 
tion), ratified by the United States in 1902, provides for 
the intenunen t of the belligerent troops as follo\\?s: 
Article LVII. A neutral state which receives in its territory troops 
belonging to the belligerent armies shall intern them, as far as possible, 
at a distance from the theater of war. 
It can keep them in camps, and even confine them in fortresses or loca-
tions assigned for this purpose. 
It shall decide whether officers may be left at liberty on giving their 
parole that they will not leave the neutral territory without authorization. 
Article LVIII. Failing a special Convention, the neutral State shall 
supply the interned with the food, clothing, and relief required by 
humanity. 
At the conclusion of peace, the expenses caused by the internment shall 
be made good. 
~.\.rticle LL""\:. A neutral State may authorize the passage through its 
territory of wounded or sick belonging to the belligerent armies, on condi-
tion that the trains bringing them shall carry neither combatants nor war 
material. In such case, the neutral State is bound to adopt such measures 
of safety and control as may be necessary for the purpose. 
Wounded and sick brought under these conditions into neutral territory 
by one of the belligerents, and belonging to the hostile party, must be 
guarded by the neutral State, so as to insure their not taking part again 
in the military operations. The same duty shall devolve on the neutral 
State with regard to wounded or sick of the other army who may be com-
mitted to its care . 
. Article h_"'\:. The Geneva Convention applies to sick and wounded 
interned in neutral territory. 
If the cre\\?S of the abandoned \\?ar vessels of State X 
had gone to the shore of State Y as a portion of the mili-
tary force of State X they \\?ould have been interned 
during the re1nainder of the \\?ar, according to the provi-
sions of the Hague Convention, to \v1lich 1nost of the 
States of the \Vorld are parties; or, even if not a party to 
the convention, State Y \Vould intern them, in accord 
\vith the general international practice. 
Effect of going on board public rvessels.-In going on 
board of the \var vessels of States A, B, and C, the cre\\?S 
of the vessels of State X practically enter the jurisdic-
tion of States A, B, and C. Upon these \\?ar vessels of 
States A, B, and C no other State \v·ould claim any juris-
diction unless the peace of the port or the safety of the 
State \vas threatened, and even then action \Yould ordi-
narily extend only to expelling the vessel from the port. 
Hence neither Y nor the United States \Vould interfere. 
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As the crew'"s of the abandoned vessels haYe, by enter-
ing the \Var vessels of States, A, B, and C, entered \vi thin 
the jurisdiction of those States, it may be prestuned that 
they w"ill observe their international obligations. It 
\Votlld not be incumbent upon the comn1ander of the 
United States \Var vessel to infor1n the other command-
ers as to their obligations or to make claims. He 
might \vith propriety confer \vith them in regard to the 
disposition of the cre\VS in question and indicate the 
line of conduct that he thought to be proper. 
Chino-Japanese war of 1894-95.-During the Chino-
Japanese \Var of 1894-95, certain neutral '"·ar ships res-
cued Chinese soldiers in Korean W'"aters. Of these acts 
Takahashi sa ~ys : 
As already mentioned, the French war ship Lion brought 45 Chinese 
soldiers to Chemulpo, and a German war ship sent back 120 Chinese soldiers 
from the islands in the Korean waters to Tientsin. The action of the 
French rnan-of -war was very hm:nane in rescuing the Chinese, who were 
clinging to the masts of the sunken ship, but the act of the German Yessel 
was not admissible from a legal point of view. The Chinese who were on 
the islands in the Korean waters were not in danger of their lives; on the 
other hand, it \Vas said that they were displaying their usual lawlessness 
in plundering the villages of the island. They belonged to the crack regi-
ment of the Chinese army, and it might be expected that they would 
serve again as soldiers. To send back these soldiers to China \Vas noth-
ing but giving assistance to one of the belligerents. By the law of nations, 
any belligerent can release prisoners on exacting an oath that they will not 
take arms again. But there is no precedent for a neutral restoring soldiers 
to one belligerent without taking the trouble to exact such an oath from 
them. (lnterna.tional Law during the Chino-Japanese war, p. 51.) 
Takahashi admits that the soldiers 1night have been 
paroled, but denies the right of a neutral \Var vessel to 
restore the1n. 
Ohemulpo affair, 1904.-The case of the rescue of the 
officers and cre\vs of the Russian ships V ariag and 
Korietz in the harbor of Che1nulpo, in the Russo-Japanese 
\Var affords a valuable precedent. The accounts of the 
circumstances vary some,vhat (La,vrence 67, War and 
Neutrality in the Far East), but the follow·ing seems to 
be the course of events : 
Japan severed her diplomatic relations w·ith Russia 
on February 6, 1904. 
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On February Sth Admiral Uriu, of the Japanese navy, 
demanded of the senior Russian naval officer that he leaYe 
\Vith the forces under his connnand the harbor of Che-
Inulpo before noon of the 9th of February. In case of 
failure to comply \Yith the cle1nand, Ad1niral Uriu threat-
ened attack upon the Russians. Adn1iral Uriu cautioned 
neutral v-essels to keep clear of the field of possible action. 
Earlier in the day the Russian gunboat, l{orietz, had 
started for Port Arthur from Chen1ulpo, but seeing the 
Japanese Yessels approaching, had returned to Chemulpo. 
It appears that byn1idnight of February 8th the Japanese 
forces, \vhich had been landed, \Yere in effective possession 
of Chemulpo. Early jn the n1orning of the 9th the 
Japanese \\~ar v-essels steamed out beyond the harbor. 
Before noon the Russian \essels, TT ariag and Korietz, 
started out. Before 1 o'clock these vessels, after a brief 
engage1nent, returned to the harbor of Chemulpo. The 
V ariag \Yas abandoned and sank during the afternoon. 
Boats fron1 neutral \Yar v-essels in port received the per-
sonnel of the TT ariag and put them on board the Brj tish 
\Var vessel Talbot and the Italian \Var vessel Elba. The 
cre\Y from the Russian \Yar vessel J{orietz, \vhich seems 
not to ha\e been injured in the engagement, later left 
that vessel in their O\Yn boats and \Vent on board the 
French \Var vessel Pascal. Shortly after\vards, the Korietz 
ble\V up. The cre\V of a merchant vessel under the Rus-
sian flag, after setting fire to their vessel, also sought 
refuge in the Pascal. 
vVhile it has been claimed that the Japanese admiral 
demanded the Russian refugees as prisoners of \Var, the 
follow·ing is, upon good authority, asserted to be the fact: 
The admiral in command of the Imperial Japanese fleet at Chemulpo did 
not make any demand for surrender to him of the Russian officers and men 
rescued from the sunken ships V ariag and K orietz. 
The surv·ivors of the above-mentioned ships were temporarily taken on 
board the French man-of-war Pascal, British man-of-war Talbot, and Italian 
man-of-war Elba, but the representatives of France, Great Britain, and Italy 
at Seoul, having asked the views of the Japanese representative there in 
regard to the mode of sending back the said Russians, the Imperial Govern-
ment instructed their representative to consent to the proposition on the 
following conditions: 
(1) That the survivors of the Russian ships would be sent to Shanghai. 
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(2) That the Russian GoYernment would giYe assurance that the said 
sun-h·ors would not be allm,·ed to go to any place north of Shanghai. 
The French representatiYe addressed an official note to the Japanese 
representatiYe, transmitting there'\'\·ith a list of the names of the Russian 
sun·iyors, signed by the captain of the Pascal, and gi,ing assurance that the 
captain of the said Yessel would not hand oYer the Russians to the authori-
ties of other countries unless he obtained a guarantee from the said authori-
ties to the effect that they "·ould neYer be allowed to again take part in any 
act of hostilities. Thereupon the Pascal was permitted to sail for Shanghai 
"-ith 8 officers and 39 petty officers and men from the V ariag and 9 officers 
and 160 petty officers and men from the Korietz on board. 
The British representatiYe also addressed an official note, transmitting 
therewith a list of the names of the Russian survivors, signed by the captain 
of the Talbot, declaring that until the cessation of hostilities they would be 
detained within the British dominions. Thereupon the British ship 
Amphitrite '\Vas permitted to sail for Hongkong with the chief executive 
officer and other officers and men from the Variag on board, altogether 
numbering 27.5. 
The Italian representatiYe addressed an official note to the Japanese repre-
sentatiYe, transmitting therewith a list of the Russian survivors, stating that 
they would be taken to Shanghai and there instructions from the Italian 
GoYernment as to the disposition of these men would be asked. Thereupon 
the Italian man-of-war Elba was permitted to leave for Shanghai with 7 
officers and 17-l petty officers and men from the Variag. 
This recent exa1nple is in accord "-ith the general 
principles governing in analogous cases. 
J{leen' s opinion .-I(leen gives a conclusion also "-hich 
"-ould support the action of the neutral w,.ar vessels. 
He says: 
Particulierement difficle est la question de saYoir comment traiter des 
fuyards trouYes par des naYires neutres sur mer (sur des iles, des debris, 
etc.). Une distinction essentielle semble de-voir etre faite selon qu'il y a, ou 
non, danger de mort. Dans le premier cas, et quand meme les fuyards ne 
seraient ni blesses ni malades, ils se trouYent dans une situation analogue <t 
de tels, plutot qu'<t celle de simples fuyards sur les territoires et dans les 
ports, puisqu'ils sont entre la Yie et la mort et exposes <t la perte £\. moins 
d'etre secourus. A defaut de stipulation positiYe, il semble done juste de 
les traiter d'apres les dispositions de la Con,-ention de La Haye du 29 
juillet 1899 (art. 6, 8 et 10), assurant la protection des naivres transpor-
tants, et des naufrages, blesses et malades, il. condition de garanties contre 
leur rentree dans la meme guerre comme combattants. Si au contraire les 
fuyards recontr~s sur mer sont hors de danger de mort, la question de 
savoir si l'humanite exige de donner suite i\ leurs reclamations de secours, 
peut dependre du degr(• de detresse ou ils se trouYent. S'ils sont 
ramasses par un naivre de guerre neutre ou en haute mer, ils sont places 
dans la meme situation juridique que des fuyards entres sur un terri-
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toire neutre, sujets i'tl'internement. Que si celui-ci etait impossible ~1 cause 
de l'eloignement. de l'f:tat du naivre, ils peuvent 0tre remis :'tl'Etat conven-
able le plus proche avec des garanties contre leur rentree an service belliger-
ant. Si c'est dans des eaux territoriales et par un nain·e neutre marchand 
qu'ils sont re<,·us, cc naivre doit les remettre :\ l'Etat territorial, :\ moins 
que celu. n'implique un smTice de transport interdit pour le compte d'un 
belligerant, et cet X::tat agira comme envers des fuyards entres sur son terri-
toire. (Kleen. La Xeutralite. Vol. II, p. 32.) 
Gonclusions.-.A .. s these cre\\'"S enter upon the vessels of 
States A, B, and C, those states becon1e officially respon-
sible for their treatn1ent. The practice is such that had 
they gone ashore in the harbor b~~ putting the1nselves 
under the jurisdiction of State l~. they "'"ould have been 
interned. By going on board of the "'"ar vessels of. States 
.A .. , B, and C, they put the1nselves under the jurisdiction of 
those states and should be interned or other"'"ise disposed 
in such 1nanner that they ,, .. oulcl not. again participate in 
hostilities during the ren1aincler of the "'"ar. 
It may be said, therefore, that-
(a) The clai1n of the United States conunancler \Yas 
not justifiable, as he had not captured t.he vessels of State 
X and could exercise no jurisdiction w·i thin the port of 
neu tra.l State X or upon the neutral \\'"ar vessels belonging 
to States A., B, and C. 
(b) The proper adjust1nent of the case under considera-
tion "'"ould be the internment of the rescued sean1en or 
other disposition by 'vhich they should not again take 
part in the 'var. 
It 1nay be noted that this case particularly sho\vs the 
need for further agree1nent upon the rules of 1naritime 
w,.arfare. 
